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The basic problem with the modern liberal theory of rights is, then, its low estimation of human being contrary to the widely held practical beliefs.
Such an initial assumption makes it too difficult to derive the notion of innate dignity or worth, and makes basic duties too easily overwhelmed by the prudential concerns of self-interests.For this reason modern liberalism is criticized, perhaps with some justice, for adopting an unnecessarily dim view of human nature and for ignoring the inherent moral potential in a human being.By undermining social duty and legal constraints on personal gratification of desires, it is charged,
the radical individualistic tendency in modern liberalism dehumanizes human beings.I argue below that Confucianism, while fundamentally a duty ethics and despite its own problems, provides a salutary correction to such a tendency and, if properly construed, is capable of accommodating a well-balanced theory of rights.
4.2.From Universal Duty to Universal Rights: A Confucian Transformation?
We have already seen that, as a consistent implication of the Confucian belief, the universal respect for human dignity carries the demand that the state and society must protect and help cultivate the innate virtues in every individual human being, and this task is probably best achieved by providing a constitutional system of basic rights.It is nevertheless true that such a system of rights has been conspicuously lacking throughout the Chinese history.It appears as if that, by emphasizing social duty, the traditional China were diametrically opposed to the modern west.The reason for such difference lies partly in the different conception of equality.As Munroe points out,
the classical Chinese philosophers recognized only natural equality in the sense that everyone is born with innate virtues as unique human potentials, but denied actual equality that all men could in fact develop their nature to such an equal extent as to entitle them to equal respect.In Confucianism, this view had justified the hierarchical structure of society and the denial of popular participation in government.By focusing on the capacities that the people have in fact developed through learning and education, the Confucianists had limited the participation in government to a small group of elites, and ignored the notion of innate moralrights developed in the West, which entitles every adult to some form of participation.As a result, Confucianism had never developed an explicit notion of “rights”--not modern political right to participation, not the Lockean right to property in virtue of one’s labor, not even the Hobbesian natural right to self-preservation.Similar to the classical and Medieval counterparts in the West, Confucianism was decidedly duty-orientated.In what the Chinese view as a just society, one’s “right” (that is, social, economic and political privileges) was to be made strictly proportional to the degree of actually developed worth and ability.The state and society must be run by the most virtuous and worthy, who almost always remain a small minority, and it seemed to them patently absurd to allow the ignorant, selfish, and morally immature mass to choose their own leaders.To the contrary, Confucius and his followers were simply concerned with how to make men virtuous and, at the same time, make the virtuous men rule.
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